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How to find Europe in Romania 
Are you specialising in European affairs, do you want to learn more about the European Union and to contribute to 
Romania's preparation for integration? If you are interested and are looking for more information, documentation and 
advise, find here the main European information and documentation sources in Romania. 
Delegation of the European Commission in Romania 
Str. Grigore Mora 11 
Bucharest 
Tel: 230 36 36 
Fax: 230 24 53 
Contact: members of the press and information team, Phare infor-
mation officer 
The Delegation represents the European Commission and provides 
information and documents on the European Union and locally moni-
tors the Phare programme in Romania. The Delegation has a reading 
room for consultation of publications on spot. it offers free of cost 
booklets and different documents in varius EU languages; some 
documents are in Romanian. 
Centre for European Information 
Str. George Enescu 27-29 (INID building) 
Bucharest 
Tel/Fax: 613 49 28 
Contact: Mr. Tudor Savu 
Documents available on hard copies or compact disc: official publi-
cations of the EU, European legislation, periodicals, reports, studies, 
analysis, statistics published by EU institutions, information on the 
activity, policy and programmes of the EU 
Euro-Info Correspondent Centre 
Bd. N. Balcescu 22 (Romanian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry) 
Bucharest 
Tel: 336 66 90 
Fax: 336 67 83 
Contact: loan Ciuperca (director), Gela Rotaru, luliana Mihalcea 
Available: information and documentation on trade opportunities in 
Europe especially for small and medium enterprises 
National School for Political Sciences and Public Administration 
Bd. Schitu Magureanu 1 
Bucharest 
Tel/ Fax: 312 25 35 
Contact: Lucica Preda, Andreea Vieru 
Eur-OP (Office for Official Publications) sales agent: 
Euro media 
Str. G-ral Berthelot 41 
Bucharest 
Tel/ Fax: 210 44 01, 614 06 64 
Contact: Mrs. Camelia Serban 
Available: sells publications of the Office for Official Publications 
(Luxembourg) 
Council for European Integration - Government of Romania 
Palatul Victoria 
Piata Victoriei 1 
Bucharest 
Tel: 222 36 92 
222 36 95 
222 37 23 
(Directorate for institutional cooperation 
for European integration) 
(Directorate for integration startegy and 
harmonization of legislation) 
(Directorate for financial cooperation 
and economic assistance) 
Fax: 312 69 29, 222 39 18, 223 01 26 
Available: Information related to the activities of the directorates, 
documentation on request, two own periodical publications 
N.B. Within each ministry there exist units for European integration 
for the specific sector. Units for European integration are also orga-
nised in the counties within the county-prefecture 
Council of Europe - Information and Documentation Centre 
Str. Alexandru Donici 6 
Bucharest 
Tel: 211 68 10 
Fax: 211 99 97 
Contact: Mrs. Mirella Hagiopol (director), Mrs. Alina Costache 
Available: documents of the Council of Europe 
Western European Union - Information and Documentation Office 
Bd. Primaverii 50 
Bucharest 
Tel: 222 94 30 
Fax: 222 56 26 
Contact: Mrs. Carmen Badea, Mrs. Gabriela Berindean 
UNESCO CEPES - Information Centre 
Str. Stirbei Voda 39 
Bucharest 
Tel: 613 08 39, 613 06 98 
Fax: 641 50 25 
Contact: Mrs. Cecilia Preda 
Available: the library has publications on higher education and data--
bases of higher education institutions in Europe, North America and Israel 
Library 11 Fundatia Cartii 11 
Bd. Ana lpatescu 3 
Bucharest 
Tel: 650 70 40 
Fax: 650 34 73 
Contact: Mrs. Marilena Cnap (director) 
Available: sells academic profile books and periodicals from 
European and other publishing houses on sociology, history, polito-
logy, informatics, management, medicine etc. Consultation of cata-
logues possible 
Social Dialogue - Tripartite Secretariat 
Splaiul lndependentei 102 A 
Bucharest 
Fax: 312 34 81 (at Cartel Alfa temporary) 
Contact: Septimia Dobrescu 
Available: information on tripartite-relations (government, trade unions, 
patronat) in Romania and related to Europe, documentation in library 
CRIMM - Romanian Centre for Small and Medium Enterprises' 
Development - CADEL 
Str. Ion Cimpineanu 20, room 307 
Bucharest 
Tel/ Fax: 628 36 34 
Contact: llie Negroiu 
Available: information on SMEs and SME financing programmes 
FIMAN -International Management Fundation - Resource Center 
Str. Povernei 6-8, groundfloor 
Bucharest 
Tel: 2111949, 211 19 45 
Fax: 211 19 37 
Contact: Mrs. Adriana Ionescu 
Available: information on management, social sistems, and labour 
market, employment mesures, local development, small and medium 
sized enterprises, managent education 
FDSC - Civil Society Development Fundation - ONGs Development 
Str. Maria Tanase nr. 3, bi. 13, ap. 14 
Bucharest 
Te: 675 27 64 
Fax: 330 58 42 
Contact: Ana Maria Purecel 
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FLEXIBILITY 2 
With 15 member states the EU quickly 
found that not everyone was always 
happy to do everything together. The 
differences in needs as well as 
approaches to the idea of European 
union has led to the introduction of a 6 
new concept in EU thinking-
flexibility. European Dialogue 
examines this idea and how it relates 
to the candidate countries . 
APPROXIMATION: 
ENVIRONMENT 
In order to join the EU, candidate 
countries need to bring their laws in 
line with the Union 's acquis 
communautaire (body of EU law). 
In the environment area this is a 
complex process. 
9 EU ASSISTANCE 
The EU Phare programme has been 
the Union's principal instrument 
for co-operation with the candidate 
countries. Phare now is shifting into 
high gear to concentrate on support for 
the accession process. 
10 HOW THE EU WORKS 
The group of permanent 
representatives to the EU from each 
member state, Coreper, as it is known, 
plays an important and decisive role 
ENLARGEMENT 
Many economists are looking at the 
costs and benefits of EU enlargement. 
12 in the functioning of the Union. 
A report from CEP R says the 
10 candidates will gain from EU 
membership while the Union 
members will also see benefits. 
INTERVIEW 14 
As Luxembourg takes over the 
Council presidency, European 
Dialogue talks with Jean-Claude 
Juncker, Luxembourg's Prime 
Minister, about what his country hopes 
to achieve during its six-month term. 
POLITICS 16 
A N D C U R RE NT AFFAIRS 
CONSU M ER POLICY 21 
Every member of the European 26 Union is a consumer, but in the past 
this large and important group has 
had little voice in the Union's 
decision-making process. From now 
on consumers will be able to take 
more control. 28 
European Dialogue explains the 
function of this group. 
STATISTICS 
European Dialogue looks 
at the economic situation 
in the 10 countries and 
how they are progressing. 
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
Cf'E; x/1s 
Flexibility became a key word in the negotiations on a revision of the 
-Maastricht Treaty, just as 
subsidiarity was central to the 
Maastricht negotiations themselves. Talk of subsidiarity 
then made it possible to avoid the controversial 
implications of federalism and references to flexibility 
now make it possible to steer clear of unwelcome notions 
of a two-speed European Union (EU). 
The term flexibility in fact covers two situations. In the 
context of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) 
revising the Maastricht Treaty, it refers to a situation 
where a group of countries are anxious and ready to 
press on with a particular aspect of integration and 
their partners are unable to make the same move. 
But flexibility is also an appropriate name for a 
general approach that has pervaded the 
integration process - readiness to 
accommodate the difficulties of one or 
more member state by derogations or 
different time scales for phasing out 
exceptions. 
The most far-reaching case of flexibility 
was the accession of a new country which 
benefits from a transitional period during 
which it gains from derogations which 
the EU seeks to limit as much as possible 
in both extent and duration. 
require agreement on a single complex set of rules. 
Instead, member states would assume that their partners ' 
requirements matched their own legislation. More 
generally the EU was increasingly working not with 
regulations, binding in detail, but with directives, which 
set a target to be met but leave the member state free to 
determine how it will meet the requirements. 
In the Maastricht negotiations, there were two 
developments which tested the EU's readiness to practice 
flexibility. One was Britain's refusal to accept the social 
chapter in the draft treaty. The other was the 
adoption of the detailed measures agreed for 
establishing economic and monetary union 
(EMU). 
Flexibility is an appropriate name for a general 
approach that has pervaded the integration 
process - readiness to accommodate the 
difficulties of one or more member state by 
derogations or different time scales for 
phasing out exceptions. 
Separate from the successive enlar-
gement negotiat10ns, there is a 
continuous process of legislation, 
building up the mass of jointly accepted 
measures known as the acquis 
communautaire. In the early years of 
integration, there was reticence about 
admitting derogations, which were seen 
as a threat to the cohesion of the EU. But 
as the Community became more 
established, it could afford more 
flexibility. 
In the 1980s it was admitted that 
harmonisation of norms - for instance 
for professional qualifications - did not 
FITNESS CLUB 
The episode of the social policy chapter 
turned out to be an exercise more in 
inflexibility than in flexibility. Britain was 
firm in its refusal of the planned social 
policy measures - and their 14 partners 
equally determined to have the EU press 
ahead in this area. The social protocol, 
thought up under the pressure of political 
conflict, did meet the requirement of 
allowing the EU to proceed, but it was not 
an acceptable long-term solution, above 
all in an area which all governments have 
pronounced as being a top priority. 
Progress also went slowly because the 
other countries were banking on a change 
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of government in Britain, leading to a change of policy on 
EU social policy. These hopes were justified when one of 
the first acts of the new Labour government in Britain 
following its election in May 1997 was to announce that it 
would end the opt-out and come into line on social policy. 
The episode of Britain's opt-out was undoubtedly one of 
the primary factors stimulating work on flexibility in the 
context of the JGC. The other was the commitment to 
accession for 11 and possibly more countries. Given the 
major gaps in levels of member countries and many of the 
central European and Baltic states, it was predictable that 
the former would not be prepared to let themselves be 
delayed in their progress with integration by any 
problems of their new partners. 
The EU must not be for ever bound to advance at the speed of 
its slowest members. 
Already in the general outline for the JGC tabled in 
Dublin at the end of 1996, it was stated that "flexibility is 
one of the most important issues being examined by the 
conference. Whatever may be agreed in this regard - or 
alternatively the absence of agreement - will be of the 
greatest importance for the future development of the 
Union." 
The Commission has said, on the eve of the biggest 
enlargement it has ever undergone, "the EU must not be 
for ever bound to advance at the speed of its slowest 
members". 
Support grew towards the end of 1996 for the idea of a 
general mechanism that would allow member states that 
wanted, to move forward subject to certain conditions, by 
means of enhanced co-operation within the single 
institutional framework of the Union as defined in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Mention of this possibility was made in the Franco-
German document of October 1996, in a proposal from 
Portugal in December 1996 and in an Italian document of 
January 1997. They all insisted flexibility would come into 
play only when it was clearly impossible for all member 
states to progress together. There was then the issue of 
how the flexibility mechanism would be sparked off. 
The flexibility formula differs profoundly from the British 
opt-out. Britain's position is that flexibility cannot be used 
unless it is agreed unanimously. However, its position is 
not fixed: there could be agreement on flexibility by a 
qualified majority if the action taken by the member states 
is added to the acquis communautaire (body of EU law). 
One of the key challenges in the next enlargement will be 
to deal with a maximum of problems in the accession 
treaty and the provisions of the transitional periods to be 
negotiated with each new member. There would then be 
less pressure for derogations. 
Italian Commissioner responsible for the single market, 
Mario Monti, wants to achieve the completion of that 
concept. An economist by training, Mr Monti has made it 
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clear that he sees no incompatibility between the single 
market target and this use of a flexibility approach. In a 
recent press conference presenting the Commission's 
proposals for amending the capital adequacy directive 
which ensures the financial stability of credit institutions 
and a level playing field for financial services in the single 
market, he paid particular attention to flexibility. "When 
drawing up legislation we need to maintain the necessary 
flexibility to take account of special situations," he said. 
The text itself covers companies operating only in certain 
commodities, almost all of which operate in the City of 
London. For this specific market segment Mr Monti 
pointed out, "we have provided for a conditional period 
to adapt to the new rules while laying down a common 
objective to be achieved by the end of 1999". He hoped 
that in the intervening period the companies themselves 
would "develop appropriate models enabling them to 
apply the common rules and at the same time draw 
benefit from them". The Commissioner saw this as a good 
case of the compatibility of the single market goal and the 
commitment to flexibility. 
So the EU has a record and an approach inspired by 
flexibility - extending both to accession and to the 
complex work of integration. It also has a well-established 
tradition of negotiating accession agreements. But with 
each enlargement its relative weight and influence 
develop relative to that of any particular candidate for 
membership. 
The vital negotiations starting in 1998 will be tough for all 
the candidates. They may need to call on the flexibility 
which the EU has practised in the past. There will no 
pick-and-choose when candidates negotiate membership 
terms, however. All new member states must be in line 
with existing EU laws and reinforce co-operation m 
relevant areas. • 
John Lambert, Brussels 
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Flexibility is a way around EU grid-lock 
If greater flexibility proves the only practicable way of preventing the process of European integration grinding to a halt, then the approach would seem best suited for 
- use in the Union's two inter-governmental pillars. 
Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, European 
policy-making is divided into three fields, or pillars. The 
first pillar is the existing European Community where 
European level laws are passed after a proposal from the 
European Commission has wound its way through various 
stages of scrutiny in various consultative groups like the 
Economic and Social Committee, as well as the European 
Parliament and Council of Ministers. 
The second and third pillars are different, with policy being 
formulated through inter-governmental agreement. The 
second pillar deals with what is known as common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP). It covers issues such as defence 
and the Union's position on international events, for 
example the war in former Yugoslavia. 
The third pillar covers justice and home affairs and deals 
with topics such as immigration, asylum policy and police 
co-operation. For the Commission the nature of the first 
pillar makes the introduction of flexibility a dubious 
option. The approach clearly would not work for any of the 
Union's common policies. These by definition require 
agreement. Named after the Luxembourg village where it 
was signed, this accord deals with police co-operation and 
the removal of internal border controls between certain 
member states. Schengen already exists in theory between 
France, Spain, Portugal, Germany and the Benelux states. 
French disapproval of Dutch drug policy means it has not 
been fully implemented at the France-Benelux border. 
Italy, Greece, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
along with two non-EU member states, Norway and 
Iceland (both members of the European Free Trade Area), 
are currently queuing up to join. 
But Britain and Ireland have everyone to agree to the same 
approach. Similarly the single 
market must be based on 
Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, European policy- said they are not happy to 
abolish internal EU borders and 
their position is unlikely to shared assumptions and harm- making is divided into three fields, or pillars. 
onised legislation. The system is still far from functioning 
perfectly and a proliferation of national opt outs from 
single market provisions would effectively cripple. it. As 
these two areas make up the vast majority of the first 
pillar's content, there does not seem to be much room for 
manoeuvre. 
But despite its innate wariness of anything which smacks of 
a la carte Europe - when member states pick and choose 
exactly what they do and do not wish to sign up to - the 
Commission is at least prepared to entertain the idea that 
flexibility could prove useful in pillars two and three. 
"The areas of the second and third pillars are the ones 
most frequently mentioned as likely candidates for a 
flexible approach. This can be explained by the fact that 
these are newer, less integrated and often more sensitive 
areas: defence, arms policy, Europol and the incorporation 
of Schengen in the treaty are regularly mentioned," noted 
a recent Commission report on the issue. 
The strongest argument for flexibility is that it simply 
institutionalises practices which already exist. Supporters 
of the approach have argued that if it is not incorporated 
into the treaties, those member states who want to move 
ahead faster than others will do so anyway outside of the 
EU. Ultimately, they say, this would be more damaging to 
the European idea than refusing to entertain any 
discussion of the concept. 
In the third pillar, one obvious area where the approach 
may prove useful is over the future of the Schengen 
4 
change. Flexibility would allow the agreement to be 
incorporated into the acquis communautaire (body of EU 
law) while allowing Britain and Ireland their opt-outs. 
The approach would also get around problems surrounding 
the role of the fledgling European police agency Europol. 
Despite the fact that the convention setting up the agency 
still remains to be ratified in the majority of member states, 
there are already calls being made for Europol's powers to 
be increased. The most recent of these came in the report 
on organised crime presented by a high-level group of 
national experts to the June European Council meeting in 
Amsterdam. 
Given that it took an extremely frantic bout of last minute 
negotiation to get Britain to agree to the Europol 
convention in its present form, some form of flexibility 
would seem the best hope for those wishing to go further. 
In the second pillar flexibility could be used to deal with 
issues such as the traditional neutrality of Ireland and 
Sweden. Such problems will need to be overcome if the 
Union ever wants to set up any sort of European army or 
defence force outside Nato. 
But some argue that this particular issue is already being 
addressed in other ways, particularly through the proposed 
practice of constructive abstention. 
Second pillar decisions currently require unanimous 
approval by member states. This new approach would 
allow certain initiatives to go ahead even if certain 
countries abstained from voting. In a scenario where troop 
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deployments were envisaged for example, those countries 
abstaining could perhaps contribute money instead of 
personnel. The precise decision-making mechanisms of 
constructive abstention differ from those for flexibility but 
the end result - that some countries could push ahead 
without others - remains basically the same. 
As the Union prepares to welcome new member states, the 
need for flexibility can only increase. 
The introduction of the new member states will mean the 
gap between the Union's most and least developed 
economies can only widen with the result that the states 
leading the integration pack will want to press ahead, 
allowing the others to catch up later if they want to. 
The structured dialogue which has accompanied this 
particular round of enlargement means all of the applicant 
states are actually well informed about the way the Union 
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is developing and the obligations membership will impose 
on them. Under this process they are systematically 
updated on all aspects of EU business. 
"The presidency and Commission provide regular 
briefings to applicant countries. They are aware of what 
flexibility means to them," says one official. 
As far as policy areas covered by the second and third 
pillars are concerned, it seems clear flexibility will happen. 
All the Commission can hope to influence is whether it 
takes place inside or outside the EU framework. • 
Timothy Davidson, Brussels 
5 
The accession process of the associated countries to the EU is entering a 
-crucial phase. The opinion on the applicant 
countries, assessing how close each country is to EU 
policies and legislation in many areas, including the 
environment, has now been issued. 
Ritt Bjerregaard, Commissioner responsible for the 
environment, takes a keen interest in the approximation 
process. She has or will visit every candidate country before 
the end of 1997 and intends to keep a close eye on the 
accession process. "It would be a misunderstanding to see 
the environmental dimension of the enlargement process 
only as one which just will add to the already long list of 
problems which have to overcome by the newcomers to the 
Union," she says. "In the approximation process the most 
pressing priority is the setting of priorities in realistic and 
costed programmes for implementation. Environmental 
approximation is not just a question of getting the 
necessary pieces of legislation in place. We have to assess 
what concrete actions and decisions are needed in terms of 
environmental policies, time and money to secure the 
smoothest possible compliance with the environmental 
requirements of the EU." 
The existing EU environmental legislation, collectively 
known as the environmental acquis, consists of about 300 
pieces of legislation, 20 per cent of which are related to the 
environmental requirements of different industrial 
products. These laws need to be implemented in national 
legislation in order to enter internal market. The remaining 
80 per cent of the legislation is equally important and needs 
to be implemented as well. 
This process, generally referred to as approximation, is 
taken very seriously by the Commission. The environment 
directorate-general (DGXI) is working on an analysis of 
the EU environmental and nuclear safety acquis in order to 
clarify the main implementation steps and implications for 
each group of laws. A document is being prepared which 
the candidate countries could use as a guide in their 
approximation work. 
All EU assistance to the candidate countries now is focused 
on the accession process. The core of this assistance will be 
in institution building, but greater emphasis will also be 
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placed on concrete investments needed for implementing 
legislation in line with EU requirements. The creation of 
accession partnerships will be the basis for future EU 
assistance and the implementation of environmental law 
will be in the forefront when new assistance priorities and 
programmes are agreed. 
It would be a misunderstanding to see the environmental 
dimension of the enlargement process only as one which just 
will add to the already long list of problems which have to 
overcome by the newcomers to the Union. 
It is the responsibility of each country to prepare for 
accession. Improvement of environmental management 
and of the quality of the environment will not be possible 
without national commitment -and the necessary legal, 
institutional and financial management reforms. Assistance 
provided by the Commission or individual EU member 
states can help individual country efforts, but are not a 
substitute for action at national level by each applicant. 
The purpose of environmental policy is outlined in the 
Fifth Environment Action Programme presented by the 
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Commission in 1993: "Towards 
Sustainability". Sustainable 
growth respecting the environ-
ment was introduced into the 
treaty in 1992 as a principle 
objective of the Community. 
Environmental considerations 
need to be applied to many 
aspects of government and 
industrial policies. Concerns 
about the environment should 
be contained in the formulation 
and implementation of econ-
omic and sectoral policies, 
decisions taken by public 
authorities and how production 
processes are developed. 
The concept of integration is a 
central element of EU environmental policy. Industry needs 
to increase its environmental performance so that it 
contributes to sustainable development. At the same time it 
has to recognise and safeguard its own future. The challenge 
is to promote sustainable production and consumption 
patterns in which environmental performance and 
competitiveness go hand-in-hand. 
There are two important reasons why environmental policy 
and legislation needs to be established at EU level. Many 
environmental issues are of a trans-boundary or global 
nature. The global issues that worry Europe 's citizens the 
most are well-known - for example, the threat of climate 
change and the destruction of the ozone layer. Other issues 
requiring a regional approach are acidification and 
persistent organic pollutants. The EU needs a common 
policy framework for addressing these issues, and a 
common voice with which to speak in the relevant 
international fora. The EU also needs to safeguard 
Europe's internal market from unfair competition as well 
as to promote the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and people. A common European environment policy 
avoids the temptation for member states to take measures 
which may be incompatible with the internal market. 
EU environmental legislation originally followed the 
"command-and-control" approach - specific environ-
mental controls were put in place in response to specific 
environmental problems. An example of command-and-
control legislation is the setting of EU-wide limit values for 
the emission of particular substances from specific 
industrial processes. 
Substantial environmental improvements have been 
achieved in this way, but the traditional command-and-
control approach has limitations. 
Coverage of the different types of environmental impact is 
to some extent incomplete and fragmented. Measures 
taken to avoid air pollution, for example, may simply shift 
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the problem to water or the 
production of waste, rather 
than reducing the impact on the 
environment as a whole. 
Another problem is that this 
approach is not flexible 
enough. Telling industry 
exactly what to do, and in which 
way it must be done, does 
not encourage a proactive 
] approach. The idea is to 
~ t encourage industry to improve 
c:, ] its environmental performance 
~ by itself and to develop a sense i of shared responsibility. 
., -~ Respect for the environment 
,\,..~ ~ ~hould not be a burden for 
c-:i mdustry, but seen as an 
opportunity to stimulate innovation and to reduce 
inefficiencies. 
One signal of the more integrated approach within the EU 
was the adoption in September 1996 of the Council 
directive on integrated pollution prevention and control. 
This directive is a modern, flexible legal instrument which 
marks out the fundamental obligations of industry in 
relation to protection of the environment but at the same 
time is not over-prescriptive in saying how those 
obligations are to be met. 
Under EU law, industry is also responsible for avoiding the 
production of waste and for managing waste where it is 
unavoidable. It is responsible for using energy efficiently, 
for preventing accidents and for returning the site to a 
satisfactory state after the plant is decommissioned. The 
key concept involved in the fulfilment of these obligations 
is that of best available techniques, commonly referred to 
as BAT. 
Techniques mean not only the technologies used, but also 
the way in which the installation is designed, built, 
maintained, operated and de-commissioned. 
Environmental considerations have to be integrated into 
the entire life-cycle of the production process. 
The Commission organises an information exchange on 
BAT between industry and the member states. It also 
publishes the results every three years. Supporting the EU 
in this is the European IPPC (integrated pollution 
prevention and control) Bureau in Seville. The bureau has 
a multi-annual work programme designed to ensure that 
results are published for each of the industrial sectors 
included in the directive. 
Environmental agreements can be used at all levels from 
local to international. The Environment Council has 
endorsed a proposal by the Commission to conclude an 
agreement with the car industry to improve vehicle fuel 
efficiency in order to reduce carbon dioxide em1ss10ns 
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from passenger cars. Discussions are currently under way 
with the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association on this. 
The present amount of EU environmental legislation is 
considerable and will continue to change during the 
accession process and beyond it. Candidate countries need 
to get to grips with this body of law, not just by placing 
statutes on the books but by putting in place the needed 
monitoring bodies. Candidate country governments also 
need to see the cost-benefit of implementation of EU 
environmental law. Often adhering to EU standards will 
not just help clean up the environment, it will also lead to 
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Both, OGXI· (environment) _anc( QGtA (e,qernal affair~} 'are:~ 
helping:-the .caAdidate countries come to terms with .the: , 
accession process in the environment sector. In additlon 
the Technical Assistance .. Information Exchange Office 
{TAIEX}, set~p)ast year to. help candidate countries ad~p;J 
and implement the EU's single market legislation/ ls 
working clo~ery with DGXI and DGIA on approxim~tion 
issues. Although only a small amount of environ~ental 
legislation is contained in the'srngle market acquis, TAlEX 
and DGXI organise s~minars at which specific 
environmental approxir:pation issues are discussed. 
W~hin ~GXI an enlarg~~ent team hasbeen set up to de!I 
with "approximation fo~.the canc;tidates. The unit, known~~s ; 
XI.A.4 ts headed by Tirno Makela. _ 
The unit works in three teams. One part is for 
environmentaJ co~operation with the candidates, headed 
by Philippe Bourel de la Ronciere. There . is also an 
enlargement team and a smaJler one dealing with 
Mediterranean programmes. 
OGXI duces ape\Nsletter,, Enlargfng the Environ .. ........ ·. t, 
pub ~ .. at least six times , a year. Although printed 
copies of the newsletter are ~!mited, the information can 
be accessed on tnternet. 
The. newsletter is meant mainly for authorities and 
decision-makers involved in the environmental 
approxim{:ltion process. It gives brief updates on new 
deveJo · ment~,i~ ~U:environmental law and policy. -. . . .·. 
A . . . , c>ne 9:et~ tine has also been set up tob!3le 
tho ' ~ns,~,,. ) or .. ~nvironmental approximatio~ 
. _, ,rmation on EU poticy and law. The service will 
help. -~m{ answers on 1egislation and policy issues, 
normally within 24 hours. It can provide specific technical 




more efficient industries and higher value-added products. 
Although the process will be complex and difficult, it is 
necessary for each candidate country to adopt these laws 
and to ensure they can comply with the tough requirements 
of the EU before becoming members. 
To help them in this task, the Commission put into place 
several assistance mechanisms (see box article). Funds 
from the EU Phare technical assistance programme will 
also be available to enable the candidate countries come up 
to the EU level in the environment field. • 
DGIA has -created a specific project under the EU Phare -
programme' for technical assistance tq help with · 
environmental approximation. Known as the . 
Environmental Approximation Facility, or DISAE 
(developing · implementation strategies for approximation· 
in the environment), it complements the TAIEX Qffice: · · 
DISAE started working in early November and will help 
support mini-projects focusing on approximation 
strategies and action programmes, institutional 
implementation and enforcement, cost assessment? . 
institutional and capacity buildif:9, assessment of draft · 
legisl~tiq?1 n~s assessment ar~ training. . ... · 
. The. key,. approximation issues ''and national . prioriti 
chosen by ·representatives of the ,ca{ldidate countries at ~ , 
DISAE seminar earlier this year .. include human resources, , .-
assessment of implementatcon and enforcement; -
financing strategies and compliance mechanisms/ ~ . 
capacity building and private finance initiatives as well as, 
economic· and cost benefit impact analysis. 
More .information on the assistance and 
mentioned is available from: 
• Enlargi{}Q the Environment _newsletter is available on ~ 
DGXl's home page (http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/ 
dg11/dg11home.html. To see a sample copy of the 
newsletter. requests shoufd ,, pe · sent by E-mail to 
en1argement@dg11.cec.be 
,,.,re7/J, ,.r,:~ . .J, ... 1. • DGXI l-/e(j:) Line Tel: (322) 29 .. -.· - . 
• DiSAE/ 57 rue Bosquet, · 1060 Brussels (Tel: (322) 534 . 
7171; Fax: (322) 534 6347; E-mail: disae@pophost 
EUnet.be). 
• TA/EX, Avenue de Cortenbergh 80, B-1 OOO Brussels 
(Tel: (322) 296 7307 or 7308; Fax: (322) 296 684-0). • · _ 
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The European Union (EU) Phare programme has been undergoing change since 
- its inception in 1989. 
Originally geared to help the economic transition in Poland 
and Hungary (Poland and Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction 
of the Economy), the programme evolved in its support of the 
accession of 10 candidate countries. 
Following the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) 
concluded in June in Amsterdam, preparation for accession 
entered a new phase. 
The latest focus of Phare reflects a profound change 
within the programme - a change needed to adapt to the 
new priorities of enlargement. 
In its first years, Phare was seen mainly as an emergency 
measure, supporting structural reform, creation of 
financial instruments and macroeconomic aid. Now Phare 
has two clear priorities, according to the strategy 
document prepared by DGIA, responsible for external 
relations with the 10 candidate countries. 
The latest focus of Phare reflects a profound change within the 
programme - a change needed to adapt to the new priorities 
of enlargement. 
Phare activity is expected to concentrate on the 
development of public services and institutions needed to 
implement EU rules to the same degree of effectiveness 
as in the present member states. Second, the programme 
will help these 10 countries bring their industry and major 
infrastructure up to EU standards by making needed 
investments. 
The whole process of introducing increasingly demanding 
EU standards in areas like environment, transport and 
industry, will require the use of significant capital funds. 
The Commission believes institutional and administrative 
capacities within the candidate countries is a major 
problem in preparations for enlargement. Phare will be 
devoting more time and money to helping admin-
istrations in the candidates equip and adopt effectively 
the acquis communautaire (body of EU law). Through 
institution building projects, Phare will help the 10 
countries reinforce democratic institutions, the rule of 
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law, public administration and auditing bodies. 
This will mean more help in training people to adopt the 
acquis in a variety of areas, such as justice, public accounts, 
financial control, environment, telecommunications, 
veterinary and phytosanitary inspection, statistics, 
technical inspection and control, energy and other areas. 
The programme will be accession-driven - focusing on the 
most pressing needs of the candidate countries' accession 
strategy. These priorities will be identified with each 
country through what the Commission calls its "accession 
partnership". This will be based around a national 
programme for the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire. 
Activities will focus on priority areas eligible for support, 
as identified in the Commission's opinion (avis) . 
Financing will be linked to projects to be completed in 
each candidate country. 
The accession partnership will include several years' 
programming of the principal measures necessary for 
adoption of the acquis and will identify activities to be 
financed or co-financed by Phare. The partnership will be 
concluded with each country from 1998. 
A global evaluation of the Phare programme also began 
in June. The Commission intends to produce a first report 
on previous evaluations and the lessons which can be 
learnt from them. The report will be supplemented by 
information provided twice a year to member states and 
the European Parliament. Ad hoe studies already carried 
out will allow, together with these new studies, a global 
appraisal of the programme's impact which will then be 
revised on a regular basis. 
While the programme's emphasis may be shifting, its 
close work relationship with the individual candidate 
countries will remain and be strengthened under the new 
strategy. Phare will continue to be the EU's largest grant 
programme, with country shares based on population, 
GDP and qualitative criteria. • 
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Ask the man in the street who takes decisions in the European Union 
- (EU), and you will hear a 
variety of answers - the European Commission, the 
European Parliament or (from the better informed) ministers 
from its member states. 
Few will pinpoint the body that in many cases puts the 
penultimate seal on EU decisions: the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, known more simply by its 
acronym Coreper. 
Comprising the 15 EU states' ambassadors to Brussels, a 
representative of the European Commission ( often its deputy 
secretary-general) and serviced by the Council of Ministers' 
secretariat general, Coreper is the last line of official-level 
decision-making before proposals reach EU ministers. 
According to Martin Westlake's recent guide, the Council of 
the European Union, "Coreper is one of the most powerful 
organs within the EU's institutional structure. It is also one of 
the most obscure." 
He adds: "A prime reason for this obscurity is that Coreper is 
composed of career diplomats whose theoretical task is 
merely to prepare the work of their political masters. In 
reality these diplomats wield considerable de facto executive 
and legislative power." 
Coreper is responsible for keeping the EU's pennanent institutions 
and the member states infonned of each others' work, to ensure that 
national and European policy are not at loggerheads, to look at 
particular issues' importance relative to the broader political project 
at hand, to find compromises and to ensure that core national 
positions are not breached. 
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Although its members are ultimately accountable to their 
member states' governments, with clear guidelines from their 
national capitals on how to approach any issue, Coreper has 
wide-ranging abilities to negotiate deals in often highly 
controversial areas. 
At first a preparatory body involved in the negotiations 
leading to the 1957 Rome Treaty, Coreper has gradually 
developed into one of the most powerful groups of officials 
in the world. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Coreper began to discharge 
its more mundane duties to specialists - resulting in the 
national representations today comprising literally hundreds 
of officials - and in 1962 split into two bodies, Coreper I 
and II. 
The permanent representatives have five major functions. 
These are information, co-ordination, interpretation, 
negotiation and defence. 
Coreper II was designated the senior, comprising the 
permanent representatives, while Coreper I became a forum 
for their deputies - an arrangement which can often confuse 
the uninitiated. 
The former are responsible for the weightier and more far-
reaching elements of EU policy, such as foreign policy or 
monetary matters, while their second-in-commands look at 
more technical aspects of the single market, for example, or 
other less politically non-controversial issues. Coreper II 
generally meets on Friday, while Coreper I meets on 
Wednesday. 
The permanent representatives have five major functions. 
These are information, co-ordination, interpretation, 
negotiation and defence. 
They are responsible for keeping the EU's permanent 
institutions and the member states informed of each others' 
work, to ensure that national and European policy are not at 
loggerheads, to look at particular issues' importance relative 
to the broader political project at hand, to find compromises 
and to ensure that core national positions are not breached. 
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In practice these five functions are extremely difficult to 
separate and merge into a more general function - to keep 
the Union working smoothly. 
The bulk of any piece of legislation will be drafted and 
negotiated by middle-ranking officials in working groups or 
committees of experts. They will then pass their portfolios on 
to Coreper under two types of circumstances. 
If a working group feels that a particular question is 
becoming bogged down in political issues, and needs a high-
level push, they will consult ambassadors for a steer. 
Once Coreper finds a solution, it will pass the dossier back to 
experts for completion of the technical issues. In some 
particularly controversial debates, ambassadors will ask 
ministers for a steer before sending the proposal back to 
experts. 
Working groups will also consult Coreper when a proposal 
has reached its final stages, or has full agreement. 
Ambassadors then give the dossier a high-level stamp of 
approval before presenting it to ministers for definitive 
adoption. 
In practice many of the more difficult deals are solved over 
lunch and in the corridors and often between alliances of a 
few powerful states. There are four major categories of player 
in any full Coreper debate. The first is the member state, 
whose task is apparent. The second is the presidency, whose 
task is to broker agreements and push the agenda forward. 
The third player is the European Commission, which in many 
cases will have proposed the legislation on the table and have 
the sole right to withdraw or modify it, although for justice or 
foreign policy matters, its role is far less active. 
Finally there is the European Parliament which exerts 
pressure from the sidelines (although not present in the 
meeting room) over an increasing number of policy areas. 
The Council of Ministers secretariat can also play an 




send it to ministers as an "A" point. That means that the 
politicians will not even debate the proposal, but wave it 
through before they move on to more difficult subjects. 
It is quite common for ministers to agree A points in areas 
which have nothing whatsoever to do with their fields of 
expertise - energy ministers, for example, may wave 
through legislation on visa policy. 
If ambassadors believe they have agreement, but for 
symbolic reasons might feel a ministerial debate should be 
held, they pass the proposal up to ministers as a "false B 
point", which in reality is treated like an A point. 
But for really knotty problems, ambassadors invite ministers 
to hold a fully-fledged debate. Clashes can also extend 
outwards to other, even rival, high-level bodies, such as the 
Political Committee, the Monetary Committee and the K4 
(justice and home affairs) committee. 
Given the level of trust imbued in its members, Coreper's role 
is already in the political rather than technical sphere. 
Ambassadors are renowned for playing one area of policy off 
another, finding over-arching compromises quite impossible 
for single issue officials. 
Since they deal with each other every week of the year, the 
ambassadors get to know each other quite well and can often 
find solutions more easily than unacquainted politicians. The 
level of trust between Coreper members is cited as a key 
element in the compromises the body can find, and also 
imbues in them a shared sense of responsibility towards the 
success of European integration. 
With the advent of up to 10 new member states to the EU, it 
is clear that the interaction between all these players will 
become even more complex and fascinating for political 
commentators. 
In an uncertain world one thing is sure - Coreper has many 
more fascinating years to come. • 
Alistair Keene, Brussels 
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Perhaps the most imp-ortant aspect of Euro-pean Union (EU) enlar-
-gement eastwards will be 
the end of any potential conflict between east and west. 
The decision by the 10 candidate countries to reject 
communism has opened the door to great opportunities for 
those states as well as the organisation which they seek to 
join. 
"A continuing success story in eastern Europe will lock in 
democracy and pro-market reforms. Moreover, 100m 
eastern consumers with rising incomes are a bonanza for 
west European businesses. Continuing economic success in 
the east will foster prosperity and peace throughout the 
continent," begins a report* by the London-based research 
organisation, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR). But the paper points out that "stagnant or falling 
incomes and impoverishment of a large slice of the 
population could foster widespread disillusionment with 
market economics and democracy. Most worrying of all is 
that this may occur while a power vacuum exists in central 
Europe." 
rich social democracies with extensive social security 
systems and are unlikely to be appropriate for poorer, but 
rapidly growing, central European nations. However, the 
candidates need market economy rules and the authors see 
merit in adopting pre-set rules, like the acquis, although 
these rules are a "sub-optimal set of rules for nations in the 
midst of their take-off stage of growth". Nevertheless, east-
west integration in Europe will expand the candidates' 
opportunities even more than it will expand those of the 
EU. Therefore, concludes the paper, integration will have a 
larger percentage impact on the GDP of the candidates, 
even without undertaking any formal estimates. 
The paper argues reasonably and thoroughly that trying to 
estimate the costs to the EU of expansion are as difficult as 
quantifying the gains to the candidate economies. What is 
clear from all scenarios and models examined by the 
authors (including cost estimates made by others), is that 
The paper, Costs and Benefits of Perhaps the most important aspect of EU enlargement 
the EU member states will gain 
some while spending a 
relatively small amount of 
money. But the projected gain 
Eastern Enlargement: the 
eastwards will be the end of any potential conflict between impact on the EU and central 
Europe, warns that economic east and west. 
failure in the east could 
threaten peace and prosperity in western Europe. "West 
European politicians have the power to meet this historic 
challenge, but contemplation of the economic and financial 
costs of doing so has led them to procrastinate. . . 
geopolitical considerations constitute the engine driving 
enlargement but the economic and financial considerations 
constitute the brake," comments the paper. 
On the plus side the report concludes that the cost of 
enlargement for the candidates ( seven of the 10 were 
included in the study: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were 
not covered), "defies calculation". The authors believe that 
the biggest cost to the candidates is liable to be the 
adoption of the EU's legislation and case law, acquis 
communautaire, which could "stunt growth and raise 
unemployment rates". 
The paper points out that the EU's rules were designed for 
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to the candidates is "enormous 
by the standards of similar 
simulation models". The effects of enlargement on the 
candidates is different, depending on what scenario is used. 
The candidates "are already keen on joining the EU for 
geopolitical reasons, so even the finding of a significant 
negative economic impact would be unlikely to affect their 
ardour for rapid membership. The same cannot be said for 
the EU and it is the EU who will decide the timing of 
enlargement . . . The EU is committed to admitting the 
candidates eventually, but their perception of the large 
economic costs of eastern enlargement seems to have made 
them reluctant to hasten the enlargement process," warns 
the report. While the paper cannot determine how the 
aggregate gain will be distributed among the present EU 15 
member states, some back-of-the-envelope calculations 
show that gains will be distributed in an uneven fashion. 
The paper claims the shares of Germany, France and 
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Britain add up to over two-thirds of the whole amount the 
EU member states are projected to gain. But given 
Germany's overall size and dominance of the EU sectors 
which are projected by the report to expand the most 
(transport equipment and capital goods), it is not 
surprising that Germany alone receives a third of the total. 
France and Britain are expected to get double-digit shares, 
not surprising given their size and sectoral composition of 
economies. Spain takes a healthy slice of consumer gains 
stemming from lower prices. All the others get less than 
five per cent of the total gain. Portugal, says the report, is 
the only EU member state which could lose out on narrow 
economic grounds, reflecting that country's heavy reliance 
on textiles - a sector which will take the biggest hit from 
enlargement according to the paper's projections. 
However, Portugal's estimated loss is so small the authors 
say it is best to think of the figure as zero. 
Contemplation of the economic and financial costs 
of enlargement has led to procrastination. 
Political considerations constitute the engine 
driving enlargement, but the economic and 
financial considerations constitute the brake. 
Costs to the EU budget "have acquired a disproportionate 
prominence in the public debate on eastern enlargement" 
declares the report, which points out that while they are 
important politically some extreme estimates have 
aroused adverse reactions. These calculations more often 
than not are based on dubious assumptions and 
projections. Given that the EU budget is a complex and 
confusing animal itself, it is probably best to side-step the 
issue altogether. The two parts of the budget most likely to 
be hit - the common agricultural policy ( CAP) and 
structural funds - will in fact probably see only minor 
outflows. While CAP's extension to the candidates is 
complex, the lack of accurate data on central European 
farms and the rapidly evolving nature of agriculture there 
makes the range of estimates on costs correspondingly 
wide. On the structural funds, the paper points out that the 
candidates' economies would not be capable of absorbing 
the estimated amount of structural funds for which they 
would be eligible. Also, the need to match EU funding by 
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the government would also be doubtful, given the 
relatively little spare cash central Europe would be able to 
spend on structure funds. It is also likely that both CAP 
and structural funds will undergo some sort of reform prior 
to enlargement and so negate many of the estimates made 
so far. 
What the paper sees as the overwhelming conclusion of its 
studies into the costs and benefits of enlargement is that it 
will be a "phenomenally good bargain for the incumbent 
EU 15. Sweeping aside questions about the timing of the 
benefits and budget costs, and the list of countries in the 
first enlargement, the net costs - transfers less benefits -
should be somewhere between zero and Ecu 8bn. Even 
the upper bound of this range is something like 0.01 per 
cent of the EU 15's GDP. This is an extraordinarily low 
cost given the historic nature of the challenge in central 
Europe," concludes the report. 
On the other hand, EU membership will be "enormously 
beneficial" to the candidate countries. "Even without 
considering transfers and even limiting ourselves to the 
conservative scenarios, membership will raise candidate 
country real incomes by 1992 Ecu 2.Sbn. Our less 
conservative estimate, which presumes that membership 
will have an important impact on the candidate country 
risk, projects very large gains of 1992 Ecu 30bn. Adding 
in farm and structural funds transfers, the figure rises to 
about Ecu 23bn for the conservative estimate and Ecu 
50bn for the less 
conservative estimates. 
. . . The importance of 
EU membership to the 
candidates, however, is 
greatly understated by 
these calculations. A 
good deal of the 
progress in central 
European transition 
has been driven by the 
prospect of an early 
eastern enlargement. 
The need to meet the Copenhagen membership criteria 
and adopt the EU's acquis has helped all central 
European governments resist special interest calls for 
bad policy ... it is worth noting that the candidates that 
are keenest on early EU membership are the ones that 
have pushed forward their transitions the fastest. 
Delaying accession negotiations could have very negative 
effects on the candidate countries' economies and 
societies," concludes the report. • 
Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the impact on 
the EU and central Europe by Richard Baldwin, Joseph 
Franrois and Richard Portes. Economic Policy, April 1997, 
available from Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR), 25-28 Old Burlington Street, London WIX lLB 
(Tel: (44171) 878 2900; Fax: (44171) 878 2999). 
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For the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncke~ the 
- challenging task of enlar-
ging the European Union (EU) is one of the focal 
subjects of his country's six-month presidency of the 
Council of Ministers. 
Speaking during an interview in the spacious office of 
the Grand Duchy's Minister of State, as his title is styled 
officially, Mr Juncker leaves no doubt that in his 
opinion, enlargement has to be one of the Union's key 
priorities in the years ahead. 
"We shall have to determine the circle of first EU 
entrants and launch an intensive political dialogue with 
all those who cannot join the EU in the first round, 11 
says Mr Juncker. 
France's President Jacques Chirac, too, is adamant that 
. every effort must be made not to create a rift between 
participants of the first and later waves of enlargement. 
11 I am totally against creating an impression that there 
are some to whom Europe shows a cold shoulder," Mr 
Juncker, a Christian Democrat, stresses. 
The key date for the decision on launching enlargement 
negotiations will be the European Council closing the 
Luxembourg presidency, to be held in December in the 
state's capital city, Luxembourg. 
To critics who say the EU summit in Amsterdam in 
June this year has failed to enact sufficiently far-
reaching reforms to allow the EU to proceed with 
enlargement, Mr Juncker responds that the summit has 
been enough of a success not to put the EU's 
enlargement calendar into jeopardy. 
"We will begin the negotiation process when we said we 
would - six months after the conclusion of the new 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 11 he says. "In December we will 
take the first wave of decisions about who we begin to 
negotiate with." 
Mr Juncker's choice of words gives a clear indication 
that the Prime Minister would favour an option not to 
start negotiations with all applicant countries 
simultaneously, irrespective of their readiness for 
joining the Union and its single market. 
Instead Mr Juncker favours an approach whereby 
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negotiations with first-wave candidates would be 
complemented by a close political dialogue with later 
entrants. 
This would ensure that all negotiations would remain 
meaningful exercises about adapting a new entrant's 
legislation to EU norms - and providing for transition 
regimes and other special arrangements - instead of 
degenerating in the case of some countries into long, 
drawn-out, vacuous rituals of purely symbolic value. 
The Prime Minister's ambitious programme for his 
country's EU presidency includes a quiet determination 
to tackle one of the most thorny issues related to the 
EU's opening to its eastern neighbours: the difficult 
task of reforming the EU's spending on help to farmers, 
help to poorer regions and the agreement of a five-year 
package for the Union's own financing. 
11 I do not expect to achieve final agreement during our 
presidency, but I would like to see the outlines of a 
solution, 11 says Mr Juncker, who leads the EU members 
with the highest per capita income. The Prime Minister 
is keen to stress that enlargement must not lead to a 
massive wave of fresh spending, expressing a position 
mirroring that of other rich member states, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
"Cuts will have to be made in existing subsidies, 11 he says, 
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while acknowledging that it will need a hard political 
fight to ensure this. 
Yet Mr Juncker's endorsement of the Amsterdam 
summit's main political results does not mean the Prime 
Minister is entirely satisfied with what has been decided. 
11 I would have preferred a more ambitious approach to 
EU reform, 11 he says, echoing the critical evaluation by 
many heads of government and European Commission 
members of the outcome of the Amsterdam Council. 
In particular, he stresses, he would have preferred a 
greater switch to majority voting than that which has 
been decided under the stewardship of the last Dutch 
presidency. "I am a great fan of majority voting in 
Council, 11 says Mr Juncker, revealing a political approach 
to European issues typical of that of many of the EU's 
smaller countries and of the Benelux states (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg) in particular. 
"Many countries talk a lot about moving away from the 
unanimity rule, but when it comes to relinquishing the 
national veto on a concrete issue, you find that nobody 
is left around the table anymore." 
Yet Mr Juncker is confident that the work left undone 
in Amsterdam will be pursued later, and possibly even 
before the EU actually takes in the first new member 
states. "There are quite a few things I believe we should 
tackle even before the EU takes in its sixteenth 
country," says Mr Juncker, pointing to the re-weighting 
of votes in Council, the reduction of the member of EU 
Commissioners and the extension of majority voting. a 
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The presentation of the Commission's Agenda 2000, 
including the opinions on the readiness of each of the 1 O 
candidate countries to join the EU has been one the 
European Commission's busiest periods of activity. 
Commission President Jacques Santer's blueprint of how 
the EU should look after the year 2000 includes a 
programme of reform of internal policies and a new financial 
regime aimed at streamlining the EU and at the same time 
helping all 10 of the candidates - regardless of their position 
in the negotiation queue - to bring their infrastructure and 
laws up to EU standards. 
Agenda 2000 outlines the broad outlook for the 
development of the EU and its policies beyond the turn of 
the century, the impact of enlargement on the Union as a 
whole and the future financial framework beyond 2000, 
taking into account the prospect of more members. 
The individual opinions showed the depth of detail to which 
the Commission went to assess each applicant. Five 
countries are recommended to begin negotiations with the 
EU - the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia. They join a sixth country, Cyprus, which received a 
positive opinion in 1992. The other five - Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia - are said not to be ready 
to start negotiations. 
It will now be up to the Council which ultimately will take the 
decision on when and with which candidates negotiations 
will begin. That decision, together with the one on Agenda 
2000 itself, is expected to be taken at the European Council 
meeting in December in Luxembourg. 
The depth into which the Commission went for the opinions 
reflects the seriousness of the opinion. "The opinions would 
be worthless if they overlooked any shortcomings. It is all a 
question of timing. Even the ones with a positive opinion 
need to improve. It is not a distinction of yes and no, the 
opinions should not be seen in black and white terms. Some 
candidates are relatively more ready, other less ready, to 
begin negotiations," comments one Commission official. 
President Santer was keen to point out, backed up by 
External Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek, that 
even though the opinion of the Commission is that five 
candidates are not yet ready to open negotiations now, the 
Commission will review their readiness later. Regular yearly 
reviews will be done by the Commission for the Council. 
These will take into consideration changes in the candidate 
countries' position vis-a-vis the possible opening of 
negotiations and could suggest that one or more of the 
remaining five are now deemed by the Commission to be 
ready to start negotiations. 
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"None of the Commission proposals reject individual 
applicants," says Mr Santer. "The least prepared must set 
themselves the goal of future negotiation while the 
partnership for accession has been put into place so they 
can catch up." 
Mr van den Broek adds: "The Commission is proposing that 
from the year 2000 onwards, Ecu 1 bn a year be made 
available from the structural funds and Ecu 500m in 
agricultural programmes in addition to support from Phare 
(Ecu 1.Sbn a year). 
"The reinforced pre-accession strategy will be accompanied 
by a commitment from the Union to review the progress 
made by each country in satisfying the conditions for 
membership by the end of 1998 at the latest and thereafter 
on an annual basis. On the basis of these reports the 
Commission will be able to judge when to recommend to the 
Council that further accession negotiations be opened. 
"All the applicants will thus take part in an inclusive 
enlargement process. Differentiation in no sense means 
discrimination. There will not be "ins and outs" but "ins and 
pre-ins", with the possibility for the latter to join the former 
as soon as the conditions are right." 
But the right conditions do not just mean getting the 
candidates ready. It also entails making sure the Union itself 
is able to absorb new members without difficulty. 
"We must be proactive," Mr Santer told MEPs in his speech 
to the European Parliament. "We must build a credible 
Europe." The common agricultural policy (CAP) and the 
structural funds for a start need serious overhauling - even 
without enlargement. But before the EU can expand another 
Inter-Governmental Conference needs to be convened, at 
least one year before the first new member is admitted, 
probably in 2002-03. 
This IGC will have to sort out institutional problems left over 
from Amsterdam, not least the thorny problem of weighted 
voting in the Council and limiting to one the number of 
commissioners each country sends to Brussels. 
Agenda 2000, the 10 opinions and full text of President 
Santer's and Commissioner van den Broek's speeches to 
the European Parliament are available on the Europa server: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm!agenda20000 in html, pdf and 
text format. Each EU delegation in the candidate countries 
will also have details of the opinions (see contents page for 
details of local delegation). 
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N ato expands 
After protracted discussion and debate the who and 
when of Nato 1s enlargement jigsaw is now in place. At is 
summit in Madrid in July, Nato finally named three 
countries which will be allowed to join this select club. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were all 
invited to begin accession negotiations. 
If all goes according to plan the three will sign a protocol 
of accession in December this year. Full membership of 
the alliance will then await ratification by the current 16 
members. This could be a lengthy process and perhaps 
even a contentious one, but Nato hopes to have the 
whole thing wound up by April 1999 - the fiftieth 
anniversary of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
For the three who were invited, years of politico-military 
rethinking, increased defence spending and upgrading of 
armed forces have paid off. But now that they have 
succeeded, they may find that the pressure increases, 
rather than decreases. From now on, alliance members 
will look on the three as colleagues, rather than 
candidates, and will increasingly judge them. by . what 
they can do, rather than what they were. 
Full membership could be nearly two years away. But 
during that period Nato will, as far as possible, treat the 
three as full members, involving them in all the activities 
of the alliance. Summit meetings and ministerial 
conferenc::es will not present any problems. But the real 
test v\li·f·I t>e how quickly an~. 7ffectively the thre1:l 9~n 
move ·inter Nato's integratedtnHitary structure. 
There were many others hoping for Nato membership. 
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, . Lithuania, the Former 
Yugosiav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakja and . 
Slovenia were all candidates · but all left Madrid 
The completion of the 
Maastricht Treaty's revision 
at the Amsterdam EU summit 
in June means the first 
accession negotiations with 
membership candidates in 
central Europe and the Baltic 
states should begin as 
planned early in 1998. 
While no target date for the 
actual accession has been 
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announced officially, some 
summit participants 
mentioned 2002 as the 
earliest year for which the 
first candidate country might 
actually be taken into the EU. 
However, others, pointing to 
the difficult issues both the 
EU and its future members 
will have to face in the 
membership negotiations, 
held this date to be over-
optimistic. 
The German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl reportedly said 
disappointed. These countries have long been keen to 
join the broad Euro-Atlantic security community. 
It is vital to all concerned that they should not be 
discouraged, but, having turned them away for the time 
being, Nato should not expect too much of their patience 
and understanding. As far as security and defence are 
concerned, the EU is not an alternative to Nato. The June 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty appeared to accept that an EU 
defence and security identity would be an aspiration for 
some time to come. 
So, for these countries, the only option is to remain in 
Nato's waiting room - the partnership for peace 
programme and the new Euro·Atlantic Partnership 
Council launched in May. 
However well it may be redecorated from time to time, 
nobody with much sense would want to stay in a waiting 
room forever. This is why a few key sentences in the 
Madrid summit declaration will be of particular interest. 
Many suppqsed - and Russia certainly hoped - that 
Nato enlargement would be a one:..off event. But the 
declaration made absolutely clear that the alliance witl 
continue to 11 welcome new members" and "expects to 
extend further invitations in coming years". Romania, 
Slovenia and the three Baltic states all received the 
runners-up prize of a special mention and more than • a 
hint that they would be considered n~xt time around in 
1999. 
When the winners; excitement fades and the others 
come to terms with their disappointment, Nato' s · Madrid 
summit will t>e acknowledged for what it postponed, as 
much as for what it decided - the Euro-Atlantic security 
show goes on. 
Germany would oppose a 
package solution for 
enlargement, saying there 
was no reason why countries 
such as Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic should 
all join at the same time. 
"Enlargement will be tailor-
made and won 1t come off the 
peg," said the Chancellor. 
or Warsaw than a few 
months ago, as the prospect 
of Nato membership had 
convinced politicians that the 
West would indeed open up 
its key political structures to 
the reform countries in the 
region. 
He was also reported to say 
he believed the political 
pressure towards achieving 
early EU membership was 
now less strong in Budapest 
Yet while the summit formally 
satisfied the EU's self-
imposed target to decide on 
a reform before embarking 
on the inclusion of any new 
members, the summit failed 
to agree on a formula for the 
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re-weighting of votes in the conditions and a wider modernised anti-trust rules, 
Council of Ministers and on a 
neede choice of quality products new guidelines on regional long-term concept for the on and services at lower prices, state aids and tightened 
restructuring of the European single market as well as greater personal rules on rescue and 
Commission for the day freedom for our citizens". restructuring aids. 
when the EU might count The outline of an action plan The actions envisaged The Commission also wants 
more than 20 members. to achieve a properly include: to break down barriers in 
Important and difficult functioning single market • ensuring that member services (for example, 
decisions on institutional before the introduction of the states put in place telecommunications, energy, 
reforms have been euro has been adopted by structures to allow single pension funds, collective 
postponed to a later date. the Commission. The draft market problems raised by investment funds), facilitate 
Summit participants said centres on four strategic other member states or cross-border operations for 
another, new Inter- targets: making single the Commission to be business (European 
Governmental Conference market rules more effective, resolved within strict company statute, cross-
(IGC) on EU reform was dealing with key market deadlines border mergers, payment 
almost inevitable, with the distortions, removing • strengthening checks that delays) and encourage the 
next IGC possibly having to sectoral obstacles to market common rules for development of electronic 
take place before the first integration and delivering a industrial and consumer commerce with a clear, 
new members were taken single market for the benefit products are respected regulatory framework. 
into the EU. of all citizens. A series of • setting up a one-stop-
Due to opposition from a specific actions, including shop on the Internet 
number of member states, both legislative and non- providing business with 
including to the surprise of legislative initiatives, have essential information on 
needed to many, Germany, the summit been proposed. single market regulations 
also failed to agree on a The Commission also and a conduit for fight crime 
substantial extension of the intends to publish regularly a feedback on firms' 
majority vote on Council single market "scoreboard" experience on the ground 
decisions in a number of containing detailed • simplifying single market The EU is prepared to 
single market areas. This indicators of the state of the legislation at both EU and strengthen the powers of 
means decisions will still single market and of national level and Europol so it can more 
have to be taken member states' level of • improving existing single effectively combat organised 
unanimously. commitment to fulfilling the market rules concerning crime. EU interior ministers 
Some of the more federal- action plan. public procurement, made the proposal when 
minded summit participants "The actions the application of the mutual endorsing a report from a 
saw this refusal to agree on Commission has outlined are recognition principle, select group of the EU's top 
an energetic curtailing of the ambitious," commented European standards, policemen, magistrates and 
national veto as a worrying Single Market Commissioner conformity marking of interior officials which painted 
sign for the future as the Mario Monti. "It will take products, construction a grim picture of crime. Lax 
danger of the EU getting considerable political will on products, transit rules and border controls, EU rules 
stuck in a legislative impasse the part of the Union's the links between single allowing people, goods and 
on key issue will institutions and of the market policy and the money to move unfettered 
automatically increase with member states to not only environment. and EU subsidies have 
each new member. endorse these actions but to Dealing with key market created a playground for 
The compromise struck up to carry them all through in the distortions that still persist criminals, says the report. 
establish a so-called short time available. These within the single market These criminals have 
flexibility clause, which will actions must include strict requires a number of actions resources which far outstrip 
allow EU member states to application in practice of including: removal of tax those of the crime fighters. 
act jointly within the EU existing and new single distortions (especially "Crime is more organised 
framework, even when a market rules - declarations concerning taxation of <.J 
~ 
minority of countries wishes of good intent are not capital income and cross- ~ 
not to participate, offers no enough. We have no choice border activity); creating a ~ 0 
safeguard against this, as but to follow through if we common, origin-based ii:; 
each country can block the want a single market that system of VAT; restructuring § ~ 
application of flexibility by delivers more growth, more taxation of energy products; .5 
.:: 
.:: 
wielding its national veto. innovation, more jobs, applying EU competition :,i ll 
improved living and working rules with simplified and "' :::!c,i 
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and uses to its advantage the by the Polish government. candidate countries over the of illegal immigrants with 
free circulation of goods, The project represents the next three years. Later this Latvia. Latvian citizens do not 
capital, services and people first major motorway year we will launch a new need visas to enter Denmark 
as well as technological construction project which pre-accession facility to and Iceland and agreements 
innovation," say the the Commission has been help the candidate countries on a visa-free regime have 
ministers. At present Europol able to support through prepare to join the Union," been reached with Sweden 
is limited to exchanging direct grants under the said EIB president Sir Brian and Finland. However, Sweden 
information and only once EU Phare programme. Priority is Unwin during a recent visit wants Latvia to ratify the UN 
member states have ratified being given to the use of to Budapest. Priority will be Convention on Refugees 
the agreement will they be Phare support for the given to modernising the before lifting visa requirements. 
able to pool and analyse upgrading of main east-west transport, 
data. Then Europol would and north-south transport telecommunications and 
become more operative and links. energy sectors and 
be able to make suggestions providing finance for small-
and co-ordinate with national and medium-sized 
crime fighters. enterprises and other The European Monetary 
industrial initiatives, Institute (EMI) has published a 
particularly in the private report on developments in EU 
European Investment Bank sector, said Sir Brian. "We payment systems in 1996. 
(EIB), the EU 's financing will also continue to give The report follows-up an 
money institution, has announced a special attention to earlier one on minimum 
Hungarian forint public debt environmental improvement common features for and 
Transport Commissioner Neil issuance programme under and protection in the developments in EU payment 
Kinnock launched one of the which it will initially issue context of the progressive systems. The analysis 
most important trans- bonds up to Ft 20bn (Ecu alignment of legislation with concludes that the 10 
European network (TEN) 1 OOm) in value. The that of the EU," concluded principles set out in its 1993 
corridors, the Wroclaw- programme provides a Sir Brian. report on minimum common 
Gliwice section of the A4 framework to allow EIB to features for domestic 
motorway, in May. The total enter the Hungarian payment systems have 
cost of the project is Ecu domestic capital market and visas generally been met. Work is 
350m, of which Ecu 68m finance projects in Hungary now progressing in all EU 
was granted by the EU 's with forint loans. The member states to ensure full 
Phare programme. "The programme, the first of its Estonia has approved an compliance by the start of 
project illustrates that the kind by the EIB in a agreement with Iceland on stage three of economic and 
Commission is keeping two candidate country, will also visa-free travel and the return monetary union (EMU). 
pledges with regard to the promote the development of of illegal immigrants. The EMI says the most important 
upcoming enlargement of the Hungarian capital accord went into force in May work in this field is in the 
the EU: to assist the market. and meant that Estonians are design and implementation of 
countries that have applied EIB lending to the 10 now able to travel to all Nordic a real time gross settlement 
for membership with their candidate countries countries without a visa. At the (RTGS) system in every EU 
integration ambitions and to constitutes one-third of the same time Latvia and Norway member state. A new or 
use Phare money for badly bank's overall country initialled an agreement on the redesigned RTGS system is 
needed infrastructure lending programme. It has abolition of visa requirements. expected to be working in all 
projects," commented Hans committed almost Ecu 5bn Norway is the last of the Nordic 15 EU member states by the 
van den Broek, Foreign to the region since 1990. countries to co-ordinate an end of the year. 
Affairs Commissioner. The The bank will now be agreement on the re-admission Co-operation of central banks 
A4 motorway is part of the concentrating its efforts in 
Crete corridor linking the candidate countries on 
Berl in/Dresden-Wroclaw- the enlargement process. 
Katowice-Krakow-Lvov-Kiev. "We will do our best to 
The. Commission is support [the candidate i.:: 
0 
contributing Ecu 68m, with countries] and we are well :§ 
!:: 
Ecu 225m provided by the placed to do so. We now !:: 0 




(EIB) as a loan and the the European Council to "' ~ 
remaining Ecu 57m financed lend over Ecu 3.5bn in the ::::: kl 
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and credit institutions is "although their level of 
continuing on Target - the economic development may 
trans-European automated be variable, the way they 
real-time gross settlement function politically is close to Agriculture ministers from Estonia has joined five 
express transfer system - that of western democracies". central European and Council of Europe penal 
payment arrangements which The least democratic Baltic states met in conventions. The 
EU central banks and EMI are countries in the opinion of the Bucharest in May. The conventions are on 
preparing to implement stage report are Albania, Bosnia- conference, attended by extradition, co-operation in 
three of EMU. Herzegovina, Moldova and UN experts, discussed criminal proceedings, 
Yugoslavia. Countries with ways of increasing exchange of information 
Democracy "limited democracies" include agricultural output to on foreign law, the transfer 
takes hold Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, match EU levels. of criminal proceedings Croatia and the Former and the transfer of 
Yugoslav Republic of Slovene president Milan sentenced persons. 
The European Fund for Macedonia. The report Kucan visited Budapest in 
Freedom of Expression, an concludes that in these May where he addressed Romania has agreed with 
association founded in 1987 countries "a dominant party parliament and spoke with Ukraine and Moldova to set 
at the initiative of several tries to wrest control of all the his Hungarian counterpart, up two Euro regions in 
European Parliament key aspects of the nation". In Arpad Gonez. The two areas where their three 
members, recently published the case of Romania and leaders agreed to open a borders converge. The 
its third report on the state of Bulgaria, where political Slovenian consulate in agreement was reached 
democratic processes in changes have recently Szentgotthard and a within the framework of the 
central Europe and the Baltic occurred, the authors of the Hungarian consulate in a Black Sea Economic 
states. The report drew on report believe these two place to be decided. Council. The construction 
analyses made by its own countries will move into the of new road links in the 
observers. The report category of democratic Estonia, Latvia and Euro regions will help boost 
concludes that democratic countries in the next report. Lithuania have agreed to economic co-operation and 
development in the 1 O For Slovakia, the report says dismantle the remaining cultural contacts. 
candidate countries in 1996- "the great economic progress barriers to free trade 
97 was essentially marked by that may be observed in the between them. Prime Latvia has moved closer to 
three general trends. One was country has not been ministers meeting in Parnu membership of Central 
that democratic changes in accompanied by a in May at the Baltic European Free Trade 
government showed that corresponding democratic Assembly, an inter- Agreement (Cetta) with the 
elections were working in an progress. The situation of parliamentary advisory approval by the Polish 
"acceptable manner" freedoms worsened even in body, agreed the change. government of a free-trade 
comparable to EU states. 1996. Control by Mr Vladimir The assembly also passed pact with Latvia. Current 
Leaving aside the specific Meciar's Movement for a a resolution urging the Cetta members are the 
problems of former Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Baltic states to abolish the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Yugoslavia, the problems of on political life, the state and death penalty. Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
minorities has become less of the main companies has and Romania. 
an issue. Third, the report tightened." Commission President 
concludes that those In conclusion the report says Jacques Santer visited Environment Commissioner 
countries which committed that all 1 O candidates for EU Romania in May. He told Ritt Bjerregaard wants to see 
themselves early on to membership, except Slovakia, the Romanian parliament more involvement of non-
economic and political seem to respect the political the country will receive governmental organisations 
reforms are now in the best and democratic criteria set by around $61 m (Ecu 55.4m) (NGOs) in the development of 
situation economically, the EU. in addition to the $482m candidate country 
politically and socially. A copy of the report can be already promised by the environmental policies. She 
The report says the "most obtained from the European European Bank for believes they can help push 
democratic countries" are Fund for Freedom of Reconstruction and developments in the right 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Expression, 50 rue Mouraud, Development, to help direction, particular1y by 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, 75020 Paris (Tel: (331) 4063 balance its trade deficit. influencing education and the 
Latvia and Lithuania, 7333; Fax: (331) 4063 7963). media. 
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It took a major disaster to achieve it, but Europe's consumers may finally be 
- able to make their voices 
heard in the corridors of 
Brussels. The importance of giving consumers a voice in 
the Union can hardly be overstated. Consumer policy 
has a direct effect on the lives of every single one of the 
EU's citizens. 
Perhaps the only positive results of the recent BSE scare 
are the European Commission's decision to bolster its 
consumer affairs division and moves in the other 
institutions to shift the emphasis of EU policy towards 
an appreciation of consumer safety and away from a 
single-minded drive for industrial liberalisation. 
In March 1996 the then British health minister Stephen 
Dorrell announced to a stunned House of Commons 
that there could indeed be a direct link between mad-
cow disease and its human equivalent Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease. 
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The chain of events this set in motion led to the 
uncovering of severe shortcomings in the protection of 
consumer health on a European level. A special inquiry 
committee established by the European Parliament 
concluded that the Commission and the British 
government had paid more attention to preserving the 
health of the beef market than to the health of the EU's 
370m consumers. 
A realisation of this in the corridors of power plus 
parliament's threat to sack the entire Commission led 
Commission President Jacques Santer to propose a 
massive shake-up of the directorate-general for 
consumer policy (DGXXIV) in April this year. 
Historically the Cinderella figure among the 
Commission's departments - accounting for just Ecu 
The importance of giving consumers a voice in the Union can 
hardly be overstated. Consumer policy has a direct effect on 
the lives of every single one of the EU 1s citizens. 
19m or 0.021 per cent of annual EU expenditure or just 
Ecu 0.05 for each of the Union's 370m consumers -
DGXXIV suddenly found itself boosted from under 
100 staff to over 400. 
The new department will take responsibility for the 
plethora of scientific advisory committees charged with 
analysing the latest evidence of a range of food safety 
issues, and will also take command of the food safety 
office established recently in Grange, County Meath, 
Ireland. 
The reinforced division will also have the advantage of 
being led by energetic Italian Commissioner Emma 
Bonino, no slouch when it comes to gaining visibility and 
a high-profile for her dossiers. 
Ms Bonino, who also has responsibility for the totally 
unrelated areas of fisheries policy and humanitarian aid, 
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has been pushing to raise the profile of her department 
since she arrived in Brussels. "We did not ask for this, but 
good things do sometimes come out of crises. Having 
DGXXIV with some weight behind it means we can 
finally really push consumer issues," says one of her 
senior advisers. 
The consumer lobby is in two minds over how to view 
the changes at DGXXIV. "It is not clear how everything 
is going to work. We are very pleased at the higher 
profile, but we need to 
ensure that other 
important consumer 
affairs considerations 
are not completely 
sidelined by the food 
safety issue," says 
Valerie Thompson of 
the European consu-
mer lobby, BEUC, the 
European Union consu-
mer Is organisation. 
Consumer policy first 
gained a foothold in 
the EU treaties as late 
as 1991 when article 
129a was written into 
the Maastricht Treaty. This makes certain limited 
provisions for European-level action on consumer policy 
- notably measures aimed at ensuring the efficient 
functioning of the single market -:--- but the vast majority 
of initiatives are covered by the principle of subsidiarity 
and tend to be carried out at member state or regional 
level, with the Commission attempting to play some sort 
of co-ordinating and advisory role. 
Officials say their task has been made even more 
difficult by a definite north-south split in Europe over 
attitudes to consumer policy. "ln northern countries, 
such as Britain and the Scandinavian states, consumer 
protection organisations are highly developed and 
efficient and they tend to ignore us somewhat. In the 
south people do not seem to care much. We seem to be 
caught between snobbery and indifference," complains 
one DGXXIV official. 
Many critics argue that consumer policy initiatives are 
often overridden by industrial and commercial 
considerations when they come up for discussion within 
the 20-member Commission. 
But BEUC is quick to point out that it does not always 
find itself pitted against the interests of industry. "Over 
issues such as the free market in spare car parts, for 
example, we work alongside the independent 
component manufacturers," explains Ms Thompson. 
BEUC argues that many car manufacturers are setting 
up what amounts to private monopolies by forcing 
consumers to buy visible replacement parts, such as 
radiator grilles or wing mirrors, from them alone. 
BEUC believes the scope for European level action on 
consumer protection has to be increased if Europeans 
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are to benefit fully from any advantages brought by the 
internal market. "It is no longer sufficient to have only 
national responses. You have to have European 
legislation," argues Ms Thompson. She points to a raft of 
anomalies ranging from the difficulties of cross-border 
shopping to differing rules on product labelling as clear 
examples of why European rules are needed to ensure 
consumer protection. 
While major multinational companies are well able to 
make full use of the 
massive EU single 
market, the average 
man in the street 
looking to shop across 
borders still faces 
major obstacles. BEUC 
is pushing for article 
129a to be reinforced 
when the revised 
Maastricht Treaty is 
unveiled later this year. 
Ms Thompson points to 
the provisional draft 
treaty drawn up by 
Ireland and the Nether-
Sue Cunningham Photographic lands during its presi-
dency of the EU in the second half of 1996 as a good first 
step towards the sort of legal provisions her organisation 
would like to see for consumer affairs. 
"In order to promote the interests of consumers and to 
ensure a high level of consumer protection, the 
Community shall contribute to protecting the health, 
safety and economic interests of consumers as well as to 
promoting their right to information, education and 
representation," reads the draft text. 
11 Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into 
account in defining and implementing other Community 
policies and activities," it continues. 
But consumer groups are disappointed that the Dutch 
presidency - which steered the Inter-Governmental 
Confernnce (IGC) to a close in June - did not seem to 
share the same enthusiasm for consumer policy as their 
Irish predecessors. 
The Hague is keener on ensuring that European markets 
are freer than at present, but does not seem so 
concerned that the liberalisation process should be 
tempered with parallel consumer protection measures. 
Consumers have had to remain particularly vigilant as 
the Union has sought to attain the single market. Their 
workload increased still further when Commission 
President Jacques Santer launched his action plan to 
complete the single market. 
BEUC bases its campaigning on the principle of the free 
market with some public intervention to protect 
consumer rights. Sometimes it finds itself opposing large 
industrial groups, which have greater lobbying resources. 
At other times BEUC's belief in liberalisation of markets 
coincides with the aims of commercial companies. 
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BEUC has championed the cause of customers in its 
dealings with EU institutions since the 1960s. During 
that time its tasks have grown as the number of member 
states has increased from six to 15. European 
Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler repeatedly 
stresses that when the 10 candidate countries become 
members, the number of EU consumers will increase by 
100m or 29 per cent - an 
specific areas, such as financial services," she says. A 
consumer protection law is now in it fifth year of 
consideration in the Slovene parliament. 
Already the Commission has begun to formulate its 
thoughts on what the applicant countries should be 
doing to bring their consumer legislation into line with 
the acquis communautaire (body of EU law). 
enormous challenge as well as Consumer policy first gained a foothold in the EU treaties as 
opportunity for the Union's 
business sector. late as 1991 when article 129a was written into the Maastricht 
In the Commission's White 
Paper setting out how the 
candidates should approximate 
their laws to the EU's single 
At present BEUC has just one Treaty. 
member from among the 10 
candidate countries, the Slovenian consumer 
organisation ZPS, which joined in 1995. 
EU consumers have already begun putting out feelers to 
their counterparts in the east, but have found a distinct 
lack of co-ordination on a national level. "We were at a 
conference recently in the Czech Republic. We found 
lots of regional and local groups, but not much co-
ordination. This forum actually provided a useful 
opportunity for them to meet each other and the co-
operation is now getting underway," says a BEUC 
official. 
This task should be aided by the efforts of Consumers 
International, which has taken upon itself the job of 
offering support to the candidate countries in terms of 
organisation and information policy. Breda Kutin of 
ZPS, who also represents central and eastern Europe in 
Consumers International and sits on the board of 
ERICA (European Research into Consumer Affairs), 
believes it is crucial for the applicant states to have a 
voice in EU policy formulation. But she stresses that, as 
with elsewhere on the continent, different countries 
have different preoccupations. 
"We must all do more for the consumer voice to be 
heard in the EU as a whole. In our country we are doing 
reasonably well in consumer protection, but we must 
speed up legislative harmonisation in a number of 
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market legislation, 12 of the 13 
consumer measures picked out 
were identified as being of key importance and nine 
were to be carried out as part of stage one of the process. 
They concerned product safety, classification, labelling 
and packaging of products destined for the consumer, 
indication of prices, misleading advertising, consumer 
credit and unfair terms in consumer contracts. Stage two 
measures included laws on package travel contracts. 
But the document went beyond simply outlining 
individual pieces of EU legislation. It stressed the need 
to establish the conditions necessary to operate 
consumer legislation properly. 
This would involve granting consumers fundamental 
rights, establishing an institutional structure to run 
consumer policy, ensuring sufficient consultation of 
consumer interests, providing them with the right of 
appeal and official assistance with the establishment and 
development of efficient consumer organisations. 
Most candidates have already adopted a comprehensive 
consumer protection act, but there remains widespread 
confusion about the precise scope of consumer policy. 
Similarly some individual legal initiatives have been 
taken in a number of the applicant countries. Others 
have received less thorough attention, notably 
marketing practices, unfair advertising, consumer credit 
and other financial services. 
But even where measures have been taken, most of the 
countries face considerable difficulties 
actually implementing consumer laws. 
There is often confusion over which 
minister or government department has 
responsibility for passing legislation and 
often resources are too Spartan to give 
consumer protection departments a real 
chance to carry out their tasks satis-
factorily. 
As technology advances, making cross-
border shopping easier and consumers 
become more aware of their rights, 
consumer demands for better Europe-
wide protection will only increase. • 
Reports by Anthony Anderson, Brussels 
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Top 10 consumer concerns 
Safety of genetically modified foods 
Consumers .•... are worried about the long-term 
effects of eating genetically modified food on their 
health and the environment. They lack confidence 
that proper controls are carried out by the 
European Commission or member states. 
Lowering of consumer protection 
standards 
in the single market 
Consumers fear the single market means their 
country may be obliged to accept goods and 
services from ·· other member states which do not 
conform with their own (sometimes higher) 
national standards. In some cases these rules are 
challenged as barriers to trade. 
Cross-border shopping 
Border hopping shoppers want to be able to buy 
goods wherever they are cheaper or better, 
without worrying that if something goes wrong 
they will be left with no rights. These could include 
the introduction of clear EU rules on guarantees. 
Safety and quality of meat 
BSE alerted the world to the dangers of modern 
farming methods. With many studies highlighting 
the illegal use of hormones in meat and pressures 
from the US on Europe to accept meat containing 
growth hormones, the issue of meat safety has 
taken centre stage. Consumers are aware of · the 
possibility of residue from hormones remaining in 
the meat they eat. They are also worried that 
inspection authorities, especially those in other 
member states, do not do their job properly. 
Environmental damage 
Consumers are concerned about environmental , 
damage and. pollution caused by modern living, 
especially pollution of food, water and the . 
countryside. There is no Europe-wide legislation to 
standardise or control environmental claims on 
product labels, many of which are spurious. 
High costs of buying abroad 
Consumers believe they have to pay too much for 
financial transactions if they purchase goods and 
services in other EU countries. The costs of 
changing money are high as is arranging cross~ 
border payments, which are often inefficient 
Marketing aimed at children and 
the growing trend towards hidden forms 
of advertising 
Children are increasingly subjected to commercial 
pressure in almost every aspect of their daily lives: 
This could include product-placement in films, in-
school advertising, direct mail and sponsorship of . 
children's events. Parents and teachers are 
worried about the impact. of these marketing 
practices on children and the inadequacy of the 
existing regulatory framework to deal with them. 
Clear labelling 
The proliferation of products in the single market 
means adequate information for consumers on 
what they are buying is increasingly needed. 
Without it they cannot compare new ... products 
form other EU countries with ones with which they 
are more familiar. -~ 
Liberalisation of public utilities 
There is a fear among consumers that liber-
alisation of services such as telecommunications, 
electricity, gas or transport will simply benefit 
industrial users and mean higher costs for private 
individuals. 
Effect of globalisation on the ElJ 
Consumers are worried that pressures to liberalise 
world . trade might result in the EU compromising 
its own standards and consumer preferences as 
non-EU countries impose their standards and 
rules on the Union. Trade pressures have played a 
key role in the recent approval of genetically 
modified seeds, despite consumer oppositiqn. • 
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Case study: directive on cross-border payments 
D espite the power and influence of the commercial interests pitted against them, European consumer groups can claim notable 
---successes in their constant battle to uphold the 
rights of their constituents. The most recent example was 
the adoption of a directive on cross-border payments, 
after a battle lasting 
In October 1994 the Commission finally put its proposal 
for a directive on the table and this was picked up by the 
German presidency later that year. 
There then began two-and-a-half years of frenzied 
lobbying activity, concentrating particularly on the 
European Parliament's consumer protection committee 
and national administrations. 
over seven years. 
Whatever may be said 
about the benefits of 
the single market, 
consumers have consis-
Whatever may be said about the benefits of the single market, Although substantially weak-
ened compared to the 
Commission's initial draft , consumers have consistently faced severe difficulties in transferring 
money to another country. 
tently faced severe difficulties in transferring money to 
another country. These have included double charging, 
unacceptably long delays, excessively high costs and a 
lack of effective systems for redress. 
In spite of early pressure for binding legislation, the 
Commission in 1994 started promoting the idea of a 
citizens' charter, rather than a directive, and various 
countries holding the revolving EU presidency showed 
only limited interest in the issue. 
BEUC's lobbying attack focused on all three European 
institutions: parliament, council and commission. A 
number of Commissioners were asked to put pressure on 
the two Commissioners then responsible. Key 
parliamentary committees were also instrumental in 
applying pressure. 
> .. E· .. ·.·. •·.·. u.r .. ,o .. •··· p.f! ... i.•. ',s t!,t ... ize.·.···'······'ns speak ' ,'' '. . .·, .. · . ·+ ' 
·.~ majority of E1! co~s~ers approve ~f ElJ 
'·. action~· in tl:i'~ · ffolcl of consumer·. policy; 
.· according to .a recent Eurobarometer survey*. 
---Jhe. r~port shows that .88 per cent of Eq 
citizens largely approve of EU policies and want the 
Union to go even further in its efforts to protect 
consumer rights. ·, 
Most want to see rules ensuring that every European 
citizen has easy access to the legal system in other 
member states in case of consumer problems. 
The survey found that citizens believe they are not 
aware of their rights (51 per cent) and the cost of taking 
legal action against someone is too high (50 per cent). 
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the directive finally adopted 
in April 1997 still contained 
the major points campaigned for by Europe's consumer 
groups. 
These included the outlawing of double charging, rules 
on transparency of information for consumers, time 
limits within which transfers must be completed and 
guarantees for money lost. 
The final legislation covered payments of up to Ecu 
50,000. 
BEUC's Valerie Thompson puts the success of the 
organisation 's lobbying effort down to being well-
informed, targeting its attack carefully, having a good 
understanding of the way the EU institutions work and 
interact with each other, using the media as a lobbying 
tool and at no stage underestimating the power of its 
opposition. • 
On protection standards, three quarters of those 
interviewed said these should be harmonised in the 
EU. Safety of food was the main concern of those 
surveyed, with around 35 per cent . of EU citizens 
believing food is not safe. • 
Eurobarometer 47 on consumer policy, conducted in 
February 1997. The full version of the survey is 
available on the Europa server on the DGXXIV 
home-page from June 1997. More information from 
Filippo di Robilant (Tel: (322) 296 6949) or Johan 
Reyniers (Tel: (322) 295 6728). 
25 
The 10 candidate countries are now running fast to catch-up with their economically more developed western neighbours. This report looks 
- at the situation in the 10 countries and how they 
are progressing. 
After the breakdown of central planning, all 10 associated 
countries were hit by a serious economic downturn. Even 
in the best performing countries, GDP decreased by 
approximately 20 per cent and in others it fell by more 
than one half. Since 1994 most countries are recording 
positive GDP growth again, and the fairly positive overall 
outlook of the Commission's present forecast* raises the 
question of where this evolution will bring the 10 
countries, compared to their starting position at the 
beginning of the transition period in 1989. 
In 1996 Poland was the first country to reach its pre-
transition output level again. Although Poland 
Evolution of real GDP-1989 = 100 
Lithuania Bulgaria Romania 
Latvia Estonia Hungary 
Source: DOIi, European Commission. 
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experienced a relatively sharp contraction in the 
beginning of the transition, it was the first country to 
regain positive growth rates as early as 1992. 
According to the forecast only Slovenia (in 1997) and 
Slovakia (in 1998) will be able to achieve the same before 
the end of the forecasting period. So, despite five years of 
widespread and fairly rapid economic growth, only three 
countries will be able to get back to their starting level. 
Most likely the Czech Republic will join this group of 
countries in 1999. Hungary and Romania are not too far 
off and they should be able to do the same in the early 
years of the next century. 
However, the remaining four - Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Lithuania - have little or no chance to reach their 
pre-transition starting level again in the foreseeable 
future. For the three Baltic countries, this is due to the 
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independence form the Soviet Union. For Bulgaria the 
present economic problems are the determining factor. 
Given that the 10 candidates are barely able to get back 
to their own pre-transition levels of output, it should 
come as no surprise that they have still quite a lot of 
catching up to do to reach EU output levels measured per 
head. 
To compare output levels per head between the EU and 
the 10 candidates, it is best to use purchasing power parity 
(PPP) conversion rates instead of current exchange rates. 
PPP rates correct for the over- or under-valuation of 
currencies and should be less volatile than current 
exchange rates. 
Because PPP rates are based on survey results, rates from 
different sources can differ quite a lot depending on the 
size and timing of the survey. Therefore, calculations 
using PPP rates should be seen only as indicative results 
and differences between countries should not be studied 
with a magnifying glass. 
Nevertheless, GDP per head at PPP clearly shows that 
even the most advanced candidate country will still lag 
behind member states with the lowest GDP per head in 
1998. Only Slovenia and the Czech Republic will surpass 50 
per cent of the EU average, while the average of the 
candidates is only about one-third of the EU average. • 
*In the framework of its six-monthly forecasts of the 
economic situation in the EU member states, the 
directorate-general for economic and financial affairs 
(DGII) also produces forecasts for the associated 
countries. A summary of the most recent Spring 1997 
forecast can be found in European Dialogue 1997/4. 







Latvia Romania Lithuania Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Portugal 
Bulgaria Estonia Poland CEC-10 Czech Greece EU 
Republic 
Source: DGII, European Commission. 
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TO THE EDITOR 
I wish to congratulate you on the 
article on privatisation and 
liberalisation in issue 1997/3, which 
emphasises that EU candidate 
countries - that is including the 
Czech Republic - need, for entry 
into the EU, a functioning market 
economy. This means a great deal 
more than just privatisation, 
especially when the latter has been, 
up to a point, a fiction. 
Here are a few ideas on what has 
happened in the Czech Republic. 
The world's press has at last begun 
to carry franker information on the 
Czech situation, on the huge trade 
and balance of payments deficit. 
Yet there are still plenty of experts 
around who think that the Czech 
government's new measures will put 
matters to rights, perhaps even 
before the year's end. 
Some prestige is enjoyed in this 
respect by Patria Finance, which 
produces prognoses. In 1997 our. 
foreign convertible currency debt 
should reach $25bn, although in 
1993 it was only $8.Sbn. The balance 
of payments should have a deficit 
equivalent to 9.5 per cent of GDP. 
Except that this GDP is calculated at 
1994 prices, which should be Kr 
1600bn. 
But if we took price constants of the 
late eighties, the percentage would be 
much higher. (In 1993 the GDP at 
1984 prices was only Kr 400bn.) 
According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, the 1998 deficit 
should continue to grow at the 1997 
rate, but I believe it will be much 
worse. The Czech economy has long 
functioned at below its 1989 
performance and it is plain that in 
the year 2000 it will not reach the 
level - the quality of which I am by 
no means idealising - achieved 10 
years ago. 
Compared to 1989 even the 
productivity of the Czech economy 
is down, which explains the low rate 
of unemployment. It is particularly 
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low in the processing industries, the 
very core of the economy. The 
results of the finance sector are 
unbelievable - in 1996 each and 
every employee produced a monthly 
loss of Kr 25,000. Share prices are 
falling even nominally (without 
allowing for inflation) and dividends 
are infinitesimal - if any. 
The average profit rate of a group of 
large companies that have been 
studied statistically reached a mere 
4.1 per cent in 1996 (before profits 
tax), which is far below bank interest 
rates. 
We are simply losing our 
competitiveness and this is beginning 
to be blamed in part on the EU, 
although I am not saying there are 
not things which we might well 
discuss with the EU 
Some Czech politicians pretend ours 
is a classic case of cyclical recession, 
as we know it in the western context. 
In fact it is a state of long-term 
structural crisis, crisis of productivity 
and quality of production, and of 
competitiveness, and the situation is 
getting worse. 
Your warning, expressed in the 
article, came at the right moment, but 
even so your chosen language was 
too diplomatic. It is a pity that the 
warnings uttered in 1990 fell on deaf 
ears; as when Paul Samuelson, the 
Nobel Prize-winner, said: "Most of 
us, middle-of-the-road economists, 
are surprised by what we are 
hearing. We thought that the East 
Europeans and their Harvard-
educated advisers wanted to build 
something like America after the 
New Deal. Instead we find that their 
aim is the creation of a Dickensian 
capitalism. " 
Instead, this country was overrun by 
such confused mottoes as "the free 
hand of the market will solve 
everything ", "there's no such thing 
as dirty money", "it doesn't matter 
what we make, potato chips or 
computer chips", "with privatisation 
speed is the determining factor", "we 
must turn a temporary blind eye to 
the legal shortcomings of 
transformation", "ecology is just the 
icing on the cake", etc. 
Whatever their authors might have 
intended, these were challenges to 
commit fraud and embezzlement, to 
be careless of the performance, and 
often of the disintegration of 
companies, to countenance 
environmental nihilism and the 
asset-stripping of countless firms 
and institutions. To this day certain 
politicians seek to make light of the 
situation and pretend they have 
quick and easy solutions. 
Unfortunately even many opposition 
politicians and economists do not 
understand that there is more to 
transformation to a market economy 
than just setting aside the system that 
existed here up until 1989. There are 
ongoing processes of globalisation 
and revolution in science and 
technology. Apart from restructuring 
we have to implement what is known 
in the outside world as shareholding. 
Unprecedented movements of 
finance are happening and these and 
many other issues are subjects of 
serious dispute. 
Dr J aromir Sedlak 
Prague, Czech Republic 
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